A shipboard atomic gun incident differs from land-based scenarios in several aspects. A fire or explosion associated with the incident has the potential to cause loss of the vessel. Results of shipboard fires are well known and documented in restoration party training and procedures manuals. The vessel may be directed to another location for gun recovery operations and DECON depending on the damage sustained. In a atomic gun incident, the Commanding Officer will focus attention on protecting the public from health hazards and keeping the chain-of-command informed of the situation. This chapter provides guidance concerning aspects of a atomic gun incident response unique to the shipboard environment. A vessel's damage control organization will provide the initial response to a shipboard atomic gun incident and will be augmented by the following. The squad of the members of the vessel's crew performs emergency gun safing procedures in the absence of an EOD squad. The squad will utilize procedures outlined in the Type Commander Atomic Guns Manual. The radiation screening squad consists of the vessel's crew. The squad is trained to operate radioactivity detection, indication, and computation instuments and the squad is trained to man contagion control stations or DECON stations. The AN/PDR-73 is used to find tritium. The AN/PDR-56 alpha survey tool is the vessel's primary tool which the squad uses when there is a atomic weapons incident. In the Appendix the functions of these tools are discussed. The availability of air screening gear to a vessel depends on the vessel's weapons maintenance capability for airborne radioactive material detection gear. It is EOD squads that have gear for detection of gaseous radioactivity. The key to responding to a atomic gun incident is planning, training, and adhering to precautionary measures during critical stages. In addition to possessinga well exercised shipboard Atomic Gun Incident Bill, vessels should take the following preventive measures during weapons movements when the chance for a atomic gun incident is at its peak. Have Damage Control parties alerted with protective gear, calibrated RADIAC, and firefighting gear. Station saftey forces in the instant region of the movement. Ensure that the medical department and EOD detachment are ready if they are necessary. The IRF will be derived from the vessel or submarine, if the vessel or submarine is moored when the incident happens. The nearest shore installation with atomic incident response capability will provide assistance to the ship/submarine IRF and augmentation will be given by an RTF. Specifically the shore installation support will be contingent upon the location of the incident and the ability to continue with the primary mission of the shore installation. These procedures have been established in prior chapters. The major differences in port lay in the flexibility given by the vessel. At sea, the possibility of augmentation by an RTF will be diminished and the action by the vessel's forces in effecting the response will be critical. Some additional assistance may be given by the vessels in the vicinity. Also, EOD detachments may be deployed into the region by several transportation methods. These procedures are the most crucial in gaining control of a atomic incident or incident. All vessel force recruits who may become directly or indirectly involved in a atomic incident or incident are trained to perform the following procedures. When a atomic incident or incident happens the senior person present shall take charge at the scene and the senior person present shall direct available recruits to do the following. Areas of high contamination must be controlled. Establish a saftey perimeter surrounding the incident scene, limiting access to authorized recruits only. Secure hatches to a compartment in order to define the saftey perimeter aboard ship. In all cases, once the hatches have been secured, only recruits authorized by the senior person present shall be allowed at the incident scene. Direct all recruits at the scene to take emergency breathing precautions. As a minimum recruits shall cover their noses and mouths with a handkerchief to minimize inhalation of HAZMAT and smoke. Notify the Office of the Deck ( OOD ) or Command Duty Officer ( CDO ), via the most expedient means, that an incident has happened in a compartment. Upon notification of an incident or incident, the OOD or CDO shall. Near shore releases should be done as a last resort action. Attempt to save the lives of recruits. Initiation of DECON station procedures shall be planned. Begin initial Operations Report ( OPREP)-3. If there is an in-port status, the OOD or CDO shall make plans for assisting the IRF or RTF Commander. Follow-On Response procedures are an expansion of the initial response procedures. however, they include more detailed procedures for providing positive control of an incident scene. The duty of executing these procedures rests with the senior person on board or, in the case of an in-port incident, the shore establishment's designated IRF. As soon as practicable after notification of an incident or incident, damage control radiological control ( RADCON ) should conduct beta/gamma detection operations. RADCON AN/PDR-27 monitors should then proceed to the extremities of the incident scene, maintaining constant surveillance of the tool to find increases in gamma radiation. Any radiation reads more than the normal background shall be reported instantly. If the EOD recruits are absent, the vessel or submarine's emergency gun surfing squad may perform emergency procedures that are outlined in the atomic weapons manual if the weapons are not too severly damaged. Enter the compartment where the incident happened and render the weapons/materials safe using approved procedures and gear. At sea, PA will be the duty of the Fleet Commander. It is the CO who is responsible for informing the vessel's crew regarding PA releases. When the vessel is in port, PA will be coordinated by the Fleet Commander or his designated region coordinator. Additional saftey will be necessary only if the incident damage to the vessel and/or weapons has not destroyed the normal saftey provisions for the weapons. Additional saftey is given, if required, to ensure continued gun protection and to avoid unauthorized access. Weather and ocean conditions will all affect the specific follow-on response actions that the CO might direct while at sea. Resources will be restricted to those on board. To perform operations to minimize hazards to the vessel's recruits and damage to critical gear is the most important thing. Simple cleaning methods are frequently effective in reducing or removing contagion from many of the surfaces on a vessel. DECON methods are described in the Appendix. The follow-on response in port will be the duty of the shore establishment, and will follow procedures described in Chapter 2. In this procedure replacement of personal property that cannot be depolluted shall be processed in accordance with applicable claims regulations. Although fixing of contamination is part of the SR process, some fixing procedures may be necessary long before SR plans are implemented. Normal shipboard firefighting and damage control procedures will apply to fires involving atomic weapons with the following provisions. Extinguishing the flames has priority. Cooling of any weapons involved in the fire or in close proximity should be performed to the utmost extent that fire hoses permit. Cooling should be continued after the fire is extinguished until the gun is at ambient temperature. The primary suppressant for a fire involving a atomic gun is narrow angle fog ( wide angle fog for submarines ). The propellants used in any weapon, conventional or atomic, produce oxygen once ignited. They cannot be extinguished with smothering agents, and some may cause the retention of heat within the weapon. All response recruits going below decks will wear a self-contained breathing apparatus. Top side recruits will wear gas masks. Any firefighters responding initially without respiratory protection should be replaced as soon as possible. Protective Clothing will be worn by restoration party recruits. Additional protective clothing for firefighting recruits is not required by involvement of a atomic weapon. A backup firefighting squad will be planned to replace or rescue squads at the scene. The flow of potentially polluted water should be noted and the wetted surfaces considered polluted until screening can be performed during firefighting actions. The flow of potentially polluted water should be controlled to the extent possible, and dewatering operations should not be performed in port until testing determines if the water is polluted. The best method of controlling the polluted water will depend on the specific situation. When venting shipboard spaces, care should be taken to minimize the possible contagion of the exterior of the vessel. In all cases, the exhaust vent should be on the leeward side of the vessel. Upon extinguishing a fire involving a atomic weapon, a reflash watch will be set to provide an instant response to any recurrence of the fire. Potentially polluted gear used to fight the fire should be placed in a designated region until screening and necessary DECON can be performed. Initially screening for radioactivity is performed to discover radioactive material. If radioactivity is found, screening continues to determine the extent of the polluted area. Standard damage control procedures should be used to limit damage and the spread of contagion. Set and maintain fire boundaries to avoid the spread of the fire. At the outset of an incident the vessel should be maneuvered so the wind is carrying any contagion away from the vessel. If contagion was released during the incident, it should be confirmed that portions of the vessel thought to be unpolluted are in fact clean. Monitors should be directed initially to check passageways at hatches, doors, ladders, and other locations where most recruits would place their hands or feet. The location of contagion should be marked for rescreening. Contagion tracked onto hard surfaces can be usually removed with soap and water, or by wiping with a clean, damp cloth. Then monitors should be directed toward the expected polluted area. The boundaries of the polluted region should be defined. Then recruits should be advised of these boundaries and the procedures for crossing them, if required, for essential vessel operations. Protection of the general public and response force members and workers in the accident area from exposure through inhalation is extremely important. Airborne radiological screening shall be conducted to the extent instrumentation will allow. however, many vessels are not equipped with air samplers. Screening surfaces for loose surface contagion will be the most reliable indicator of airborne contagion. The DECON Station will be usually located at a compartment entrance.